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Moscow Conceptualism has since the early 1990s gained an enormous amount of critical 
attention in Russia, Europe and North America. Indeed, its status has risen enormously with 
the historical recovery and critical repositioning of the group Collective Actions, and the 
intellectuals, writers and philosophers who worked in collaboration with the group, or in its 
orbit. This is because Moscow conceptualism achieved something remarkable during the 
period of conceptual art’s decline in Europe and America: a coherent programme of cognitive 
strategies, formal subtractions, and an expanded collective model of production and 
reception that extended the range and attributes of what we might mean by ‘conceptual art’ 
as a post-medium specific sequence of artistic manifestations.1 This points to two key issues 
regarding the development of conceptual art and the refunctioning and continuity of the 
avant-garde more generally in the 1970s:  
 
Firstly: conceptual art was not simply a globalized phenomenon in which the message of art’s 
‘dematerialization’ (to use the familiar and clichéd term) was disseminated around the world 
from its intellectual ‘homeland’ in the US and the UK, on a kind of loose and equitable basis. 
On the contrary, in the wake of conceptual art’s initial break with painterly modernism, 
‘conceptual art’ came to serve very different functions and uses, as a result of the cultural, 
social and political circumstances in which it found itself, shifting and transforming the 
character and form of conceptual art itself.2 Thus in South America - particularly Argentina 
and Chile - conceptual art’s strategies of formal negation were overdetermined by anti-
imperialist struggle, which included a critique of US American cultural imperialism and the US 
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American neo-avant-garde itself.3 In Poland, conceptual art drew on an already vigorous 
dramaturgic avant-garde tradition (Jerzy Grotowski’s ‘poor theatre’) to produce a 
predominantly event-based conceptual art centred mostly in the countryside centred and the 
suburbs, and thereby, as far as away from the industrial imaginary of Soviet socialist realism 
as possible and the prying eyes of the state.4 In Iceland, in the early 1970s the recourse to 
text and photography was, as it was in many other peripheral national European contexts, a 
means of breaking from a narrow national, painterly landscape tradition. Furthermore, the 
concerns of UK and US conceptual art were by no means compatible themselves. Many of the 
interests of ‘analytic conceptual art’ in the UK, are very different from those in the US, given 
US conceptual art’s reliance on an undisclosed formalist hangover from modernism (such as 
in the work of Joseph Kosuth), thereby weakening any assumed shared history between US 
and British conceptual artists. Indeed, as in other centres of national conceptual production 
there is an implicit assumption that much American conceptual art is turned inwards to the 
interests of the art market, and ‘business as usual’. Thus, in the group work of Art & Language, 
for instance, there was a primary concern with the intellectual division of labour and 
questions of cultural pedagogy, in the wake of the huge influx of working class and lower 
middle-class students into the art school system in the Britain in the 1960s. How might class 
experience relate to learning and value in art? How might a non-bourgeois subjectivity be 
created from the discursive opportunities of conceptual art? And how might women artists 
be an active part of this?5 As such, there were clear connections between these forms of 
group learning and the revolutionary debates on teamwork in the Soviet Union in the 1920s.  
 
In addition, we see another set of national-cultural conditions at play in the case of Moscow 
Conceptualism itself, producing a ‘conceptual art’ quite different in its theoretic-material 
concerns than other centres of production. In a period of post-Thaw, and late Soviet 
‘stagnation’, conceptual art takes the form of a generalised entropic and apophatic 
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withdrawal from the ‘public sphere’ and direct political engagement, in which the absences, 
phlegmatic silences, and textual ambiguities of conceptual art, assume a kind of moral and 
poetic antipode to the (failed) rhetoric of Stalinist productivism. Indeed, in Collective Actions 
these zero-sum manifestations, and their almost winsome indeterminancies, produce a 
radicalization of both late Descartes’ libertine motto: ‘a happy life is an unseen life’, and 
Spinoza’s rejection of ‘affect’ as a kind of bondage; art finds an active ‘silence’. In this sense 
Moscow conceptualism does share certain ‘allegorical’ affinities with other conceptual art in 
Eastern Europe; primarily the opportunity that conceptual art provides for small-scale 
temporary interventions, subtle acts of resistance, and ‘invisible’ events that provide a space 
for art’s ‘withdrawal of consent’. But in the Soviet Union, this withdrawal from consent is also 
attached to a strong commitment to collective avant-garde values, and therefore has little 
time for the ‘self-possessive’ individualism of much other conceptual art in Eastern Europe. 
Thus: we might say, that whereas Polish conceptual art has no stake in – or rather refuses a 
stake in - the memory of the (Soviet) historic avant-garde, Moscow conceptualism saw one of 
its jobs as being to reclaim and defend what remained progressive about the avant-garde 
legacy of the 1920s. 6 
 
All of these conceptual art manifestation - East and West, North and South - can be defined, 
then, as part of that great sequence of events, manifestations and intellectual horizons 
identifiable with ‘conceptual art’, yet they all put the strategies of ‘conceptual’ negation and 
denaturalization of the art object and artist to work in very different ways and with very 
different outcomes. This not only produces a striking unevenness to conceptual art in this 
period of its emergence and transformation, but also confirms the general conditions of 
belatedness of conceptual art’s relationship to an understanding of its own avant-garde past. 
Each national cultural formation was working with, and through, very different cultural and 
historical materials on the basis of very different kinds of awareness of the avant-garde past 
and the recent conceptual present. 
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This takes me to my second point: Moscow Conceptualism is defined by a range of shared 
cultural memories of the avant-garde (given  the avant-garde’s constitutive legacy, f marginal 
presence in pot-1950s official Soviet artistic history) that are grounded in a set of political and 
cultural conditions that are quite unlike any other national-based conceptual art, East or 
West, throwing into relief the complex belatedness affecting the formation and dissemination 
of conceptual art during this period of globalization. Conceptual art in Europe, particularly the 
UK and in the US, was not an unmediated transmission belt for the historic avant-garde, given 
that both sets of conceptual artists were far from conversant with the critical and artistic 
legacy of conceptual art’s own anti-modernist claims: that is, very few artists at this time in 
the US and UK had a working knowledge of the Soviet and Berlin avant-gardes (principally 
because little work was published in English on the early avant-garde period, and little work 
was shown).  Falteringly, hesitantly, then, US-UK conceptual art - through its primary critique 
of painterly modernism and dismissal of art as a would-be ‘natural kind’ - generated a loose 
pathway back to the post-medium and interdisciplinary claims of the early avant-garde 
without in fact re-historicizing conceptual art’s possible links to this past (this came much 
later). In the Soviet Union, in contrast, despite the fact that few works from the 1920s were 
on permanent display, the avant-garde legacy was not only available through the rich critical 
literatures of the period, and shared (if oblique) memory of the revolutionary past, but 
significantly, was present critically in its remnant aspects and traces, in actual everyday Soviet 
life in the 1970s: namely, the critique of art’s commodity form (given the absence of a private 
market for art), a residual anti-productivism (born of a post-Brezhnevite broken economy) 
and a commitment to a (residual) collectivism. In fact, we might stretch this sense of 
revolutionary remnancy even further back, to the days of High Stalinism in the mid-1930s.  
 
Despite the increasing state oppression and curtailment of avant-garde ideology, Soviet 
society underwent an extraordinary period of political and ethical reconstruction, in which 
the building of socialist subjectivity and a new self, drew on the memory of the 1920s for its 
bearings. Crucial to this appeal to the ‘new self’ was the importance of the citizen diary, as a 
place where the Soviet citizen could explore his or her position in Soviet society and as such 
raise its interests – as Jochen Hellbeck has outlined – “above [the] paltry parochial concerns 
[of daily life] into the higher plane of historical and action.”7 These ‘public’ diaries in the 1930s 
were a remarkably popular component of this mass mobilization of the ‘collective self’. 
Indeed, on the left, the proletarian diary was defended as a key part of the factographic and 
documentarist turn. LEF, for example in the late 1920s encouraged every proletarian to keep 
a diary in order to document their place in and contribution to the revolutionary 
transformation of everyday life. Even if this call to self-representation was uneven (many 
workers feared its consequences and many felt inadequate to the task; some diaries 
submitted to public scrutiny were barely literate), nevertheless many workers took the 
opportunity to write themselves into collective life and history.  
 
They sought to realize themselves as historical subjects defined by their active adherence to a 
revolutionary cause…They put pen to paper because they had pressing about themselves and they 
sought answers in diaristic self-interrogation. Their diaries were active tools, deployed to intervene 
into their selves and align them on the axis of revolutionary time.8  
 
Thus, even after the Party had taken its distance from the interventionist and socially 
experimental character of the diary-programme (in a drive against bourgeois ‘self-
representation’), there remained in place, a strong ethos of the socialized self, in which the 
link between writerly self-representation and life, the self and the collective, promised an 
authentic participation in a historical process larger than oneself. In this respect, despite the 
cynical narrowing of this ideal after the war, the Party sought to maintain the notion of each 
citizen as ‘consciously’ integrated into Soviet society. Moscow conceptualism, therefore, did 
not have to imagine the social character of the avant-garde through the creation of a micro 
or enclave ‘communalism’, in the manner of the post-1960s Western avant-garde, it could 
draw on its still living, if attenuated, forms and deflected agency, in the collective present. 
But, of course, if these conditions might enable the production of a conceptual art free from 
the need for the machinery of social critique and critical theory, this conceptual art was not 
free of its own local constraints and avant-garde belatedness.  
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If the group Collective Actions represents the first manifestation - loosely speaking - of the 
avant-garde in the Soviet Union for almost 50 years, it nevertheless, had no working 
relationship to the socially transformative character of the historic Soviet avant-garde; 
officially, it was claimed, this kind of work had already been done. Indeed, in many respects 
Moscow Conceptualism represents the opposite: a ghostly or revenant avant-garde divorced 
from the avant-garde’s socially constructive dynamic - precisely the condition of the avant-
garde and conceptual art, or neo-avant-garde, in the West after the Second World War – 
hence, the strange, withdrawn, oblique, indeterminate character of Moscow Conceptualism. 
As with Western conceptual art, conceptual art in the Soviet Union did not assume a primary 
field of engagement with the social and material world, but, rather, operated within the 
‘secondary’ realm of the symbolic. In other words, Moscow conceptual art was no less distant 
from the fundamental structural promise of the original Soviet avant-garde – the radical 
dissolution of art into productive labour and productive labour into art; the transformation 
of the built environment; the subsumption of art into life - than was Western conceptual art 
at the time, despite Moscow Conceptualism’s extraordinary, post-market, conditions of 
artistic production. This gives the work of Collective Actions, and Moscow Conceptualism 
generally, a haunted quality and pathos that is quite unlike any other conceptual art of the 
period (with the exception perhaps of work being done in Poland [Wlodzimierz Borowski, 
Zbigniew Warpechowski] and Czechoslovakia [Eugen Brikcius, Jan Steklik], although for quite 
different reasons). Its mode of production was free of the determinations of capitalist 
exchange (the singular commodity-form, institutional approbation, the pressure of individual 
careers defined by market identity and branding), yet this mode of production – art as a nexus 
of post-object, temporal conditions and de-reifying collective techniques - operates in a 
‘suspended’ state. Yet, this isn’t the ‘suspensive’ state of the Western avant-garde, divorced 
from a revolutionary tradition and forced to find strategies of engagement/disengagement in 
a culture in which bourgeois cultural pluralism diverts, ameliorates or blocks, the ‘world 
transforming’ and post-market functions of avant-garde practice. In the post-Thaw years in 
the Soviet Union this is a notion of ‘suspension’ as an actual state of withdrawal and radical 
non-compliance, as if participation in the official channels of cultural support was to endorse 
Stalinism and betray the legacy of cultural resistance since the late 1930s. As Keti Chukhrov 
argues:  
 
The ‘70s in Soviet society are known for economic and technological stagnation. At the same time the 
texture of social life in the ‘70s is characterized by a strange spiritual pleroma [a sense of fullness] or 
plentitude…anti-utilitarian collective consent becomes widespread, and a society grows accustomed 
to abstaining from pleasures and libidinal joys, consensus seems to be reached more often, and high 
standards of living, for construction, technical efficiency, and consumer prosperity become less 
necessary.9  
 
This places Moscow Conceptualism in an unprecedented position within the greater and 
uneven orbit of conceptual art during this period, for all this work’s varieties of engagement: 
it draws on the historic Soviet avant-garde, indeed, benefits from the living interconnection 
between conceptual art and the remnant collectives ideologies of the 1920s under the post-
market conditions of 1970s cultural production, yet, like many strategies of conventional 
modernism - that it also echoes - it withdraws backwards into the world. 
 
This invites us, to turn, therefore, to the question of cultural unevenness and the 
contemporary avant-garde. If the 1970s, in Europe, North America and the Soviet Union is a 
period of the belated possession and re-staging of conceptual art across national-cultural 
formations - under the impossible and half-forgotten name of the avant-garde itself - today 
the re-functioning of the avant-garde in the West and in Russia is, of course, no less subject 
to other kinds of unevenness, but, at the same time, crucially, it is also subject to 
unprecedented kinds of historical consanguinity, given the global and post-Cold War 
character of art and the increasing global interconnection of the cultural margins. That is, if 
UK-US conceptual art was in some sense blind to its own avant-garde legacy, given its lack of 
theoretical access to the historic avant-garde, and, therefore, had to work falteringly to 
reconstruct this legacy and its possibilities, and Moscow conceptualism was an ‘avant-garde’ 
‘at home’, so to speak, but without real transformative agency, today the avant-garde is, at 
least, freely available intellectually as an ongoing research programme in which the effects of 
the belated production and reception of the historic avant-garde are now self-consciously 
incorporated into a reflexive and historical understanding of the limits and possibilities avant-
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garde, that is, into a model of combined and uneven artistic development. In other words, 
the structural belatedness and unevenness of cultural production and reception is built-into 
the theoretical claims of contemporary avant-garde research programmes. And this 
necessarily shifts the operational and temporal terms of the avant-garde, in the light of the 
massive changes historically and culturally since the 1920s. The avant-garde is not a thing or 
‘movement’ to be now recovered in the light of this new intellectual and critical reflexiveness 
globally - as if we can now get on with the job of properly being ‘avant-garde’ - but rather, a 
set of resources and possibilities to be re-thought and re-functioned as an outcome of its 
defeats, struggles, hiatuses and caesurae over the last 90 years, and, therefore, something 
that is to be reconstructed constitutively from these hiatuses, gaps and caesurae.  
 
Thus the avant-garde maybe be no less a “suspensive” project today, than it has been from 
the late 1930s, that is, no less subject to the division between art and the social world, and 
between aisthesis and collective experience, but under present political and social conditions, 
in the wake of the global crisis of capital, the intellectual demise of postmodernism, and the 
compression and claustrophobia of neo-liberal network culture, one of its core ideals has 
nevertheless returned to central stage in order to redirect a huge amount of artistic activity: 
the totalizing critique of capitalist relations as a condition of art’s emancipatory force and 
legibility. For the first time, for a very long time, the relationship between art and praxis, and 
art and politics, art and collective experience, art and productive labour, art and free labour, 
the conditions of art’s living situatedness, art and capital accumulation, art and universal 
emancipation, are becoming the working terms and grammar of huge number of artists 
working collectively or individually on socially engaged projects that owe little or nothing to 
official or market criteria. This is an enormous social and intellectual shift within the political 
economy of art, and therefore, is irreducible to the notion these new forms of collective, 
participatory, and temporal ‘post-object’ practice, simply represent a stylistic shift in 
concerns, and, therefore, will dissolve with changed social and political circumstances. On the 
contrary, these changes represent a massive reorientation of ‘business as usual’ in art, 
transforming the artist in classic avant-garde terms from the producer of discrete objects for 
exchange on the market to the producer or facilitator of relations between things, and of 
conceptual templates.  
 
Two things ensue from these new conditions of the “suspensive” avant-garde.10 Firstly, we 
can see clearly how much of this new practice and its recent forbears, back to Conceptual Art 
and beyond, owes to the world-historical rupture of Soviet Constructivism as the metaform 
of all avant-garde research programmes in the 20th and 21st centuries. All present and recent 
practices, consciously or not, derive from this constructivist programme: that is, they derive 
from the destruction of the authority of discrete object, of authorial sovereignty and monadic 
consciousness, of disciplinary and craft unity, of aesthetic singularity, and of the non-
discursive or aesthetic-contemplative reception of art. And, secondly, under globalization, we 
can see how changes in the relations and order of avant-garde belatedness have transformed 
the perception of cultural indebtedness across national borders, and, as such, have released 
cultural peripheries, in some instances, from their subaltern relationship to the centre. So, in 
globalized conditions of transnational exchange and collaboration the Soviet avant-garde is 
no longer the ‘Soviet avant-garde’ in conventional art historical terms (namely, that sequence 
of events, works, that rises in prominence, falls away and then disappear to be recovered as 
‘influences’), but, the enduring transformative core of art’s emergence from its bourgeois 
prehistory; in other words, its universalizing dimension is released into the problems of 
contemporary practice.  
 
Yet if Western national cultural traditions can no longer secure cultural patrimony for 
themselves by simply asserting the greater authority and prestige of the (the white 
normative) centre, this is not to say that the Anglo-American imperialist relationship between 
the centre and the periphery has changed how imperial capital operates; imperial capital still 
structures and shapes global circuits of influence and power, just as it structures finance 
capital’s investment in the global art market to the advantage of the large Western-sales 
markets. But, nevertheless, in the absence of the constraints of the Cold War, and in the wake 
of de-colonialization, and the new forces of transcultural exchange, the alignment between 
imperial capital and imperial cultural power in the interests of shaping and influencing the 
cultural direction of national-states has diminished; the one-way traffic of modernization 
from centre to periphery has broken down. Peripheries remain peripheries, certainly, but 
                                                     
10 See John Roberts, Revolutionary Time and the Avant-Garde, Verso, London and New York, 
2015 
their peripheralness is no longer subordinate to an exoteric process of modernization. Rather, 
the experience of modernization on the periphery is now part of a challenge on the part of 
the peripheries to ruling definitions of modernization itself. That is, if the centre can no longer 
hold in place a Western-centric and unilinear understanding of modernization, progressive 
blocs in the peripheries have an unprecedented role to play in questioning and challenging 
the very character of modernization as part of an anti-imperialist politics. This is why cultural 
mimicry of the centre (Anglo-American imperialism) by the peripheries, in order that the 
peripheries may enter the vaunted global circuits of cultural modernity, no longer applies or 
no longer works, because the very terms of modernity as a globalized experience are now 
being shaped by the non-synchronic demands and horizons of the peripheries.   
 
Now this contribution to the critique of imperialist modernization and modernity by various 
progressive blocs within various peripheral national cultures is itself dependent upon what 
kind of periphery the country in question is and what kinds of relationship the national culture 
in question has to the dynamics of global modernity. Not all peripheries have rich and 
extensive connections to the cultural legacies of a dynamic modernity, and, therefore, clearly 
not all peripheral cultures are equal contributors to the anti-imperialist dialogue. So, this is 
why, although the new conditions of globalization have released a groundswell of other 
claims to modernity from periphery to centre, this process is itself uneven, given each nation 
state’s determinate place within the network of imperialist relations. In other words, 
Kinshasha is not Bombay, despite both having a subordinate place in the imperialist chain.  
 
This is why Russia is what we might call a privileged periphery, given its prominent place in 
the imperial world order (as a weakened imperial power itself) and its own historical and 
culture connection to epochal changes in modernization and emancipatory politics. For, 
however, marginal at the moment the country remains culturally in relation to Anglo-
American imperialism, progressive forces are able to draw on an unprecedented set of 
revolutionary cultural and political resources as a part of the ongoing debate on globalization 
and modernization. And this is why Boris Kargarlitsky is wrong when he says, speaking of 
contemporary art in Russia, in an interview with Ekaterina Dergot, that “we are still living off 
the remainders of the Russian avant-garde legacy, relying on it as parasites… our cultural 
assets are exhausted.”11 Indeed, this tone and accompanying judgement seems to me to be 
exactly what is not required under these transcultural conditions. For what the new avant-
garde globally reveals is how Russia’s position as a privileged periphery lies precisely in its 
capacity to act as a critical placeholder for the collective legacy of this avant-garde. This is not 
nostalgia, or a national propping up of an exhausted tradition, but on the contrary, a 
recognition that the huge transformations occurring globally in art, and, in the face of the still 
prevailing, if shifting, cultural unevenness of the imperial relation, the avant-garde has a 
‘home’ in Russia, so to speak, which is demeaned at its peril. Therefore, wherever and 
whatever the kind of work being done on the research programmes of a new avant-garde 
internationally, Russia will remain a privileged space of reception for this avant-garde’s 
claims, despite all the reactionary forces currently lined up against it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 Boris Kagarlitsky interviewed by Ekaterina Degot, ‘Fragile Authoritarianism’, in Post-Post 
Soviet? Art, Politics & Society in Russia at the Turn of the Decade, eds., Marta Dziewanska, 
Ekaterina Degot & Ilya Budraitskis, Museum of Modern Art Warsaw, Warsaw, 2013, p144 -
145 
 
